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THE ST J\ TE OF UT AH, 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This :3.ppeal concerns the legality of evidence 
2e1zed pursuant to a warrant and the subsequent 
conviction and sentence thereof. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendant was tried and found guilty of 
Ihe cnme of possession of marijuana. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order in harmony with 
below. .J 1 - ,(;) . . 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
William Dermody, a Deputy in the Weber Cou: 
ty Sheriff's Office, was telephoned by a nurse wh 
informed him that she had just spoken to a M' 
White and that White had not only acted an: 
talked strangely, but also that he informed her the: 
he was on a trip. The nurse informed the officer 
that her conclusion was that White was using so!l'., 
type of narcotic. This conclusion was thereafter sue 
stantiated when the peace officer was telephoned 
a Catholic father who stated that Mr. White 
been taking narcotic drugs. 
The officer then made an application for c 
search warrant and prepared a written affidavi; 
stating his reasons and the names of his informers 
as to why the warrant should be granted. 
This warrant was used by the Weber Countv 
Sheriff's Office and marijuana was found. A jury 
convicted White and the appellant, who was alsc 
living at the place searched. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS PROPERLY ISSUED 
AND THE EVIDENCE THEREBY SEIZED WAS PROP-
ERLY ADMITTED. 
The search warrant is not only a helpful tool for 
law enforcement agencies but also an effectivE 
means of controlling crime. As long as constitu-
3 
tional safeguards are met, search warrants may 
:X!Jperly be issued. Point I of this brief thereby con-
itself with whether or not these constitutional 
safeguards have been met in the instant case. 
Both the fourth Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States and the Utah State Constitution 
make the following statement: 
"The right of the people to be secure in 
their per<;0ns, houses, papers and effects against 
unreason:iblc searches and seizures shall not be 
1·iolated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place and the person 
or thing to be seized." United States Constitu-
tion, Amendment IV; Utah Constitution, 
Article I, 14. 
Utah statutes specify the required steps one 
must take hefore a magistrate can properly issue a 
warrant. In order for a peace officer to obtain a search 
warro.nt the following outlined requirements must 
be met: 
A. The complainant must be examined upon 
cath by the magistrate. Utah Code Ann. § 
77-54-4 ( 1953). 
B. The complainant must sign a written deposi-
tion (Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-4) setting forth 
facts or probable cause for believing that 
one of the following grounds exist (Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-54-5): 
l. Presence of stolen property; 
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2. Presence of property used in cornmi' 
ting a felony; or 
3. Presence of property which is intendec 
to be used in committing a public oi. 
fense. Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-2 (195j) 
A. A MAGISTRATE'S DETERMINATION Of 
PROBABLE CAUSE IN ISSUING A SEARCH WAR 
RANT MUST BE GIVEN GREAT DEFERENCE BY 
REVIEWING COURTS. 
In the case of Spinelli v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 584 
(1969) the defendant was convicted of interstate 
travel in aid of racketeering. A search warrant was 
issued upon the affiant's conclusion that the anony. 
mous informer was reliable. In holding that the 
search warrant was improperly issued because ol 
lack of information, the United States Supreme 
Court made the following significant statement: 
"The affidavit, then, falls short of the stand-
ards set forth in Aquilar, Draper, and our other 
decisions that give content to the notion of prob-
able cause. In holding as we have done, we do 
not retreat from the established propositions that 
only the probability, and not a prima facie show-
ing, of criminal activity is the standard of prob-
able cause ... that affidavits of probable cause 
are tested by much less rigorous standards than 
those governing the admissibility of evidence at 
trial ... that in judging probable cause issuing 
magistrates are not to be confined by nigardly 
limit:ltions or by restrictions on the use of their 
common sense ... and that their determination 
5 
of probable cause should be paid great deference 
by reviewing courts ... " Id., 89 S. Ct. at 590-
591. 
B. THIS AFFIDAVIT FOR THE SEARCH WAR-
RANT STA'T'ED SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SHOW 
PROBABLE CAUSE. 
As stated by Spinelli 11 • United States, supra, this 
court should give great deference to the common 
sense of the issuing magistrate. 
From the affidavit as set out in Appellant's Brief, 
pages 2 and 3, it is noted that both informers were 
named. This fact alone distinguishes the instant case 
from Spinelli and Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 
1509 (1964), and the standards set up by those cases 
dealing with anonymous informers are thereby in-
apposite. 
The appellant contends that the complainant did 
not support his claim that he had received credible, 
reliable information. This contention has no merit. 
The affidavit itself names not only the nurse who 
initially called the peace officer, but also the Rev. 
Glen M. Schrop, Pastor of St. Helens Catholic 
Church in Roosevelt, Utah. Common sense dictates 
that when a nurse calls a police officer informing 
l 1im of one who is using narcotics, and the nurse's 
telephone call is substantiated later by a Catholic 
Father, who also states that this person had been 
using narcotics, credibility can hardly be an issue. 
It would be easy for the magistrate to determine 
ihat +here were narcotics being used at 170 Ogden 
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Canyon. The nurse (who would have more familk 
ity with drugs than either the peace officer or tt. 
magistrate) had stated that White told her that f:· 
was on a trip, although William White was at horr 
when she called. Mrs. Jorgensen also stated th: 
White acted differently and that he told her h-
wanted to die and return to heaven. From thes: 
facts, which were all stated in the affidavit, Nurs: 
Jorgensen assumed Bill White was on some type 
of narcotic drug. From this testimony alone the maq 
istrate could have determined that there was pro!! 
able cause and could have issued a proper war 
rant. But in addition to the nurse's conclusion abou1 
narcotic use, Father Schrop had called the peace ol 
ficer and told him that White had been taking nar-
cotics. Common sense gave the magistrate no chokE 
-he had to issue the warrant. Note the following 
statute: 
"If the magistrate is thereupon satisfied of 
the existence of the grounds of the application, 
or that there is probable cause to believe their 
existence, he must issue a search warrant, signed 
by him with his official title, to a peace officer 
in his county, commanding him forthwith to 
search the person or place named for the property 
specified and to bring it before the magistrate." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77- 5 4-6 ( 19 5 3) (Emphasis 
added.) 
C. A SEARCH WARRANT NEED NOT NAME 
THE DEFENDANT IN ORDER TO USE THE SEIZED 
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM. 
In the instant case, probable cause was found 
to exist and a search warrant was properly issued 
-
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The warrant named William White and stated the 
address at 170 Ogden Canyon. The police officers 
were not misled. They went to the named premises 
and found marijuana there. The Utah and United 
States Constitutional requirements were not vio-
lated. The reason why the person or property must 
be particularly described is to insure that the right 
premises and right person will be searched and not 
innocent neighbors. 
A contention similar to appellant's was made in 
the case of Mil/Pr v. Siglrr, 353 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1965). 
In that case the court sets out the following guide-
line: 
"Finally, pet1t10ner objects to not being 
personally named in the warrant. This issue, how-
ever, does not appear ripe for review. It was not 
presented below in the petition and no reference 
was made to the point during the hearing. 
Therefore, this Court is not in a position to be 
.1ble to make a substantive finding on the merits. 
It might be well taken by the parties, however, 
if the Court were to make one observation. The 
warrant appears to describe with particularity 
the place to be searched and the things to be 
seized. This it-ould seem to satisfy the constitu-
tional requirements in this case, for the Fourth 
Amendment docs not require the warrant to name 
the person who occupies the described premises." 
LI., 3 5 3 F.2d at 428. (Emphasis added.) 
This dicta would apply to our fact situation. The 
N,:nrant described the place to be searched, and 
ncimr::d the tenant. This satisfies the requirements. 
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There was probable cause for believing sufficient 
grounds. The informers were named, common sense 
demands credibility in this case, and the place to be 
searched was adequately described. Therefore, the 
search warrant was properly issued and the evi-
dence thereby seized was properly admitted. 
D. APPELLANT HAS BEEN DENIED NO SUB-
STANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
The facts in this case are as follows. A receipt 
was made out for a pipe. Officer Dermody later 
added two other items to that receipt. The receipt 
was originally given to Fred Cunico. According to 
the transcript, both White and Cunico were pres-
ent when the additional items were added. The 
policeman testified as follows: 
"I asked for the receipt back, I believe from 
Mr. Cunico and I added the other two items, and 
I am not sure which one I gave it back to." 
(R. at 40) 
There is testimony by White that he did not receive 
the receipt. (R. at 45). Cunico would be the logical 
one to have received it. He never did deny receipt. 
The question was therefore properly submitted to 
the jury. 
Once a magistrate receives the return of the 
warrant he also should receive a verified affidavit 
by the peace officer at the foot of the inventory. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-54-15 (1953). Also note the following 
statute: 
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"The magistrate must thereupon, if required, 
deliver a copy of the inventory to the person from 
whose possession the property was taken, and to 
the applicant for the warrant." Utah Code Ann. 
77-54-16 (1953). (Emphasis added.) 
It is not mandatory for the magistrate to give a 
copy of the inventory to the property owner. The 
court is referred to United States v. Greene, 141 F. Supp. 
856 (1956), wherein the court correctly points out 
that the weight of authority favors the idea that: 
" ..... [S]taturoy requirements as to the 
receipt and inventory are only ministerial, and 
that failure to comply therewith will not invali-
date a valid warrant, or render inadmissible the 
articles seized." Id., 141 F. Supp. at 858. 
Substantial compliance with statutes governing the 
execution of search warrants is all that is required. 
United States v. Freeman, 144 F. Supp. 669 (1956). 
POINT II 
THE JURY INSTRUCTION PROPERLY STATED 
THE LAW, AND WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
The instruction given is quoted in part below: 
"You must find that State's exhibit C. (the 
pipe) and I or State's exhibit B. is marijuana 
prohibited under the Utah statutes from being 
in the possession of anyone .... To qualify the 
material must be leaves or stems. They need not 
be ID any particular quantity because the law 
to (sic) distinction between the posses-
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sion, though the amount possessed may be of con-
cern to a judge in passing sentence, it would not 
be material to the guilt or innocence of the de-
fendant except a person cannot be guilty without 
consciousness thereof." (R. at 17, Instruction 
No. 6). 
The court is given discretion in certain types o! 
punishments. 
"When discretion is conferred upon the 
court as to the extent of punishment, the court, 
at the time of pronouncing judgment, may take 
into consideration any circumstances, either in 
aggravation or mitigation of the punishment, 
which may then be presented to it by either 
party." Utah Code Ann.§ 77-35-12 (1953). 
According to this statute, the trial judge did not 
misstate the law. 
The contention of the appellant is merely meta-
physical. He argues that upon hearing this instruct-
ion the jurors would find appellant guilty knowing 
that punishment would be slight. The exact opposite 
could be as easily argued. The jurors could just as 
easily have decided that since the sentence would 
be light they would find not guilty and achieve the 
sa.me result. 
In view of the common knowledge the publlc 
has of the sentencing system of our courts, no pre-
judice could have resulted in this instruction. The 
public at large knows of the things that the judge 
takes into consideration when he sentences one con-




utory Jaw, the judge merely showed the jury his 
knowledge of his own duties. 
It should be pointed out that the challenged in-
struction includes a phrase which states that the 
amount of marijuana found is immaterial to the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant. This statement is 
found after the challenged clause. 
Courts frequently find that no prejudicial error 
results fro".11 comments or instructions by the Judge 
informing the jury of the possibility of parole, when 
no death penalty was imposed. See Cullens v. State, 
94 Ga. App. 894, 96 S.E.2d 540 (1957); McKee v. State, 
159 Fla. 794, 33 So. 2d 50 (1947); People 1'. Suk.do!, 322 
Ill. 540, 153 N.E. 727 (1926); and Goddart v. State, 65 
Okla. Crim. 472, 88 P.2d 911 (1939). 
POINT III 
WITHOUT A SHOWING THAT THE PRE-
SENTENCE REPORT INJURED THIS APPELLANT, 
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD CONTINUE TO RE-
FUSE REVIEW OF THIS TYPE OF ISSUE. 
In Utah it is common practice for the judge to 
examine pre-sentence reports in order to pass a fair 
sentence on the convicted felon. The preparation of 
this report is one of the duties of parole and proba-
tion officers. 
With statutes very similar to ours, the Idaho Su-
preme Court has dealt with this problem several 
times .The most recent Idaho decision on this point 
finally places Idaho in the same judicial position as 
Utah has been for many years. 
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In State v. Rolfl', 92 Idaho 467, 444 P.2d 428 0968), 
the Court was dealing with a person convicted of 
rape. A pre-sentence report was presented to the 
Court for examination. The Idaho Supreme Court 
looked at its previous decisions which seemed to 
indicate that the complete pre-sentence report had to 
be disclosed to both parties. The Court courageously 
made the following statement: 
"We now modify these rulings to comport 
with what this court deems the better rule, name-
ly, that the trial judge has discretion as to whether 
the full contents of the pre-sentence report be 
disclosed to the defendant at the hearing on 
his application for probation. Where the trial 
judge chooses not to disclose the report, he is ob-
ligated, however, to give the defendant sufficient 
information concerning adverse matters con-
tained therein so that the defendant may be in 
a position to offer intelligent refution." Id., 444 
P.2d at 433-434. 
This decision makes good judicial sense. Persons 
may feel free giving information to a probation offic-
er to be included in a pre-sentence report if they 
know that their identity will not be revealed. But if 
the full report were to be made public, the desired 
information would be small indeed. 
The appellant does not allege that he asked the 
Judge what particular matters were taken into con-
sideration in passing the sentence. He therefore does 
not fit into the better rule as laid down by the Idaho 
Court. 
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Many years ago, Utah passed on this question 
and came up with the same answer that Idaho reach-
ed last year. In the case of State 1·. Martin, 49 Utah 346, 
164 P. 500 (1917), the Supreme Court of Utah was 
asked to consider a case where judge's preliminary 
remarks indicated that he was influenced in the 
sentence he gave by facts and circumstances of 
other encounters with that defendant. The court held 
that since the fairness of the trial was not questioned, 
the issue was not reviewable by the Supreme Court 
but should be presented to the board of pardons. 
There is nothing in the record to show that Ap-
pellant was not adequately given opportunity to 
question or object to the sentencing process in this 
case. This question then, should not be a reviewable 
issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons submitted, the Respondent urges 
the Honorable Court to affirm the lower court's rul-
inq. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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